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Effort et contrats : quelques enseignements concernant le marché du travail

  • André Zylberberg

[spa] Esfuerzo y contratos : algunas lecciones relativas al mercado del trabajo, por André Zylberberg. Cuando algunas variables no pueden ser verificadas por un tribunal, los contratos deben ser implícitos y auto-ejecutorios. En este artículo se analiza mediante un modelo simple, la manera en que este tipo de contratos permite entender mejor el que surjan ciertas características ligadas al funcionamiento del mercado del trabajo y que no parecen poder ser explicadas a priori gracias a un modelo puramente competitive Entre éstas se examinará más particularmente la forma óptima del contrato de salario, el perfil de las retribuciones en el ciclo de vida, la existencia de los mercados internos y los sistemas de promoción. [ger] Arbeitsanstrengungen und verträge: einige Angaben über den Arbeitsmarkt, von André Zylberberg. Wenn bestimmte Variablen nicht durch ein Gericht überprüft werden können, müssen die vertraglichen Vereinbarungen implizit und selbsterfüllend sein. Anhand eines einfachen Modells wird in diesem Artikel analysiert, wie diese Art von Verträgen die Entstehung mancher Merkmale besser verstehen helfen, die mit der Funktionsweise des Arbeitsmarktes im Zusammenhang stehen und die sich, wie es scheint, zunächst nicht mit Hilfe eines reinen Wettbewerbsmodells erklären lassen. Untersucht werden insbesondere Merkmale wie die optimale Form des Lohnvertrages, das Entlohnungsprofil während des Lebenszyklus, das Vorhandensein interner Märkte sowie die Aufstiegssysteme. [eng] Efforts and Contracts: Some Information on the Labour Market, by André Zylberberg. When certain variables are unable to be checked by a court, contracts need to be implicit and self-enforcing. This article uses a simple model to analyze how such contracts enable a better understanding of the appearance of certain characteristics in the functioning of the labour market, which would not appear to be explicable using a purely competitive model. Some of the main characteristics studied by the article are a wage contract's optimal form, the remuneration profile over the life cycle, the existence of internal markets, and promotion systems. [fre] Effort et contrats : quelques enseignements concernant le marché du travail, par André Zylberberg. Lorsque certains événements ne sont pas vérifiables par un tiers, les contrats doivent être implicites et auto-exécutoires. Cet article analyse, à l'aide d'un modèle simple, comment ce type de contrats permet de mieux comprendre l'émergence de certaines caractéristiques liées au fonctionnement du marché du travail et qui ne semblent pas a priori explicables à l'aide d'un modèle purement concurrentiel. Parmi celles-ci on examinera plus particulièrement la forme optimale du contrat de salaire, le profil des rémunérations sur le cycle de vie, l'existence des marchés internes et les systèmes de promotion.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/ecop.1994.5664
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_1994_num_113_2_5664
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 113 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 1-20

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1994_num_113_2_5664
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1994.5664
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop

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