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Les contrats auto-exécutoires et la théorie des institutions du marché du travail

  • MacLeod, W. Bentley

    (Centre de recherche et de développement en économique (C.R.D.E.), Université de Montréal)

In this paper, the theory of self-enforcing contracts developed in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989, 1991) is outlined. It is shown how the existence of incomplete contracts can help us understand why labour markets are not perfectly competitive. In particular, the model of self-enforcing contracts provides some new insights into the existence of dual labour markets in developing countries and inter-industry wage differences. L’étude reprend les éléments essentiels de la théorie des contrats auto-exécutoires (self-enforcing contracts) présentée dans MacLeod et Malcomson (1989, 1991). Nous montrons que l’existence de contrats incomplets peut nous aider à comprendre pourquoi les marchés du travail ne sont pas parfaitement compétitifs. Le modèle des contrats auto-exécutoires permet notamment d’apporter un nouvel éclairage sur la dualité des marchés du travail dans les pays en développement, de même que sur les différences salariales interindustries.

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Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 68 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (septembre)
Pages: 433-451

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:68:y:1992:i:3:p:433-451
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  1. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1988. "Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 832-54, August.
  2. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  3. David Card, 1990. "Intertemporal Labor Supply: An Assessment," Working Papers 649, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  4. Raff, Daniel M.G., 1988. "Wage Determination Theory and the Five-Dollar Day at Ford," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(02), pages 387-399, June.
  5. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1984. "Reputations in the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 713-25, September.
  6. Gibbons, R. & Katz, L., 1989. "Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differences," Working papers 543, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Brenner, R., 1990. "The Long Road From Serfdom and How to Shorten It," Cahiers de recherche 9004, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  8. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
  9. Brenner, R., 1990. "The Long Road From Serfdom And How To Shorten It," Cahiers de recherche 9004, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  10. Rosen, Sherwin, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1144-75, September.
  11. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  12. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
  13. Carmichael, Lorne, 1985. "Can Unemployment Be Involuntary? Comment [Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device]," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1213-14, December.
  14. Shaban, Radwan Ali, 1987. "Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 893-920, October.
  15. Coase, R H, 1988. "The Nature of the Firm: Meaning," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 19-32, Spring.
  16. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
  17. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
  18. Baily, Martin Neil, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50, January.
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