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Les contrats auto-exécutoires et la théorie des institutions du marché du travail

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  • MacLeod, W. Bentley

    (Centre de recherche et de développement en économique (C.R.D.E.), Université de Montréal)

Abstract

In this paper, the theory of self-enforcing contracts developed in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989, 1991) is outlined. It is shown how the existence of incomplete contracts can help us understand why labour markets are not perfectly competitive. In particular, the model of self-enforcing contracts provides some new insights into the existence of dual labour markets in developing countries and inter-industry wage differences. L’étude reprend les éléments essentiels de la théorie des contrats auto-exécutoires (self-enforcing contracts) présentée dans MacLeod et Malcomson (1989, 1991). Nous montrons que l’existence de contrats incomplets peut nous aider à comprendre pourquoi les marchés du travail ne sont pas parfaitement compétitifs. Le modèle des contrats auto-exécutoires permet notamment d’apporter un nouvel éclairage sur la dualité des marchés du travail dans les pays en développement, de même que sur les différences salariales interindustries.

Suggested Citation

  • MacLeod, W. Bentley, 1992. "Les contrats auto-exécutoires et la théorie des institutions du marché du travail," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(3), pages 433-451, septembre.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:68:y:1992:i:3:p:433-451
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