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Beschäftigungssicherung durch Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung

  • Carstensen, Vivian
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    Der vorliegende Beitrag begründet die Vorteilhaftigkeit von Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung bei Produktmarktunsicherheiten theoretisch über die Existenz von Arbeitszeitkonten. Das Arbeitszeitkonten Modell kombiniert dabei effizienzlohn und versicherungstheoretische Aspekte. Die Lösungen sind nachverhandlungsstabil und spot implementierbar. Unter dieser Voraussetzung sind Komplementaritäten zwischen flexiblen Arbeitszeiten und verschiedenen anderen personalpolitischen Maßnahmen nachweisbar: ein innerbetriebliches Informations und Kommunikationssystem, Weiterbildungsinvestitionen und Gruppenarbeit verstärken die positiven Effekte.

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    File URL: http://diskussionspapiere.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/pdf_bib/dp-228.pdf
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    Paper provided by Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) with number dp-228.

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    Length: 36 pages
    Date of creation: Dec 1999
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-228
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