Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of renegotiation among players. The authors study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Their main result is th at the limit of the set of payoffs from renegotiation-proof equilibria is either a singleton or a connected subset of the Pareto efficient frontier. A simple sufficient condition for the latter to occur is a lso provided. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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