Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence
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- Anders Frederiksen & Elod Takats, 2005. "Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 881, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Frederiksen, Anders & Takáts, Elöd, 2006. "Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 2447, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Frederiksen, Anders & Ibsen, Rikke & Rosholm, Michael & Westergaard-Nielsen, Niels, 2013.
"Labour market signalling and unemployment duration: An empirical analysis using employer–employee data,"
Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 84-86.
- Frederiksen, Anders & Ibsen, Rikke & Rosholm, Michael & Westergård-Nielsen, Niels C., 2006. "Labour Market Signalling and Unemployment Duration: An Empirical Analysis Using Employer-Employee Data," IZA Discussion Papers 2132, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Anders Frederiksen & Odile Poulsen, 2006. "Rising Wage Inequality: Does the Return to Management Tell the Whole Story?," Discussion Papers 05-007, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Frederiksen, Anders, 2008.
"Gender differences in job separation rates and employment stability: New evidence from employer-employee data,"
Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 915-937, October.
- Frederiksen, Anders, 2006. "Gender Differences in Job Separation Rates and Employment Stability: New Evidence from Employer-Employee Data," IZA Discussion Papers 2147, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
More about this item
Keywordspersonnel economics; incentive mix; layoffs.;
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
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