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Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain

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  • David Marsden
  • Richard Belfield

Abstract

Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show that incentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain this finding in terms of the 'beneficial constraint' arising from stronger employment protection in France, which provides an impulse to develop incentive pay; employer networking activities in France, which facilitate joint learning about its development and operation; and government fiscal incentives for profit-sharing, which reduce the cost of its operation. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2010.

Suggested Citation

  • David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2010. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 48(2), pages 235-283, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:48:y:2010:i:2:p:235-283
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Urban Sila, 2009. "Can Family-Support Policies Help Explain Differences in Working Hours Across Countries?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0955, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. David Marsden, 2010. "Individual Voice in Employment Relationships: A Comparison Under Different Collective Voice Regimes," CEP Discussion Papers dp1006, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Davide Antonioli & Paolo Pini & Roberto Antonietti, 2014. "Flexible pay systems and labour productivity: Evidence from Emilia-Romagna manufacturing firms," Working Papers 2014143, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    4. Oulton, Nicholas & Rincon-Aznar, Ana, 2009. "Rates of return and alternative measures of capital input: 14 countries and 10 branches, 1971-2005," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28687, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. David Marsden, 2010. "The End of National Models in Employment Relations?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0998, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    6. Nicolas Castel & Noélie Delahaie & Héloïse Petit, 2014. "Diversity of Compensation Policies and Wage Collective Bargaining in France
      [Diversidad de Política de Compensación y Negociación colectiva de Salario en Francia]
      ," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01625986, HAL.
    7. Valeria Pulignano & Andrea Signoretti, 2016. "Union Strategies, National Institutions and the Use of Temporary Labour in Italian and US Plants," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(3), pages 574-596, September.
    8. Nicolas Castel & Noélie Delahaie & Héloïse Petit, 2011. "Quels modes de négociation face à des politiques salariales renouvelées ?," Working Papers hal-00646434, HAL.
    9. Noélie Delahaie & Richard Duhautois, 2015. "Profit-Sharing and Wages: An Empirical Analysis Using French Data Between 2000 and 2007," Working Papers halshs-01143491, HAL.
    10. Nicolas Castel & Noélie Delahaie & Héloïse Petit, 2011. "Quels modes de négociation face à des politiques salariales renouvelées ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00646434, HAL.
    11. Petr Petera & Jana Fibírová, 2015. "Basic Approaches to Profit-Sharing and Ideas for Utilization," Český finanční a účetní časopis, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2015(3), pages 97-117.
    12. Michaël Zemmour, 2013. "Les dépenses socio-fiscales ayant trait à la protection sociale : état des lieux," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/6o65lgig8d0, Sciences Po.
    13. Patrice Laroche & Mathieu Floquet & Loris Guery & Chloé Guillot-Soulez & Anne Stévenot, 2013. "Les Relations Entre Epargne Salariale Et Remunerations : Une Analyse Des Strategies Et De La Coherence Des Pratiques," Post-Print halshs-00863544, HAL.
    14. Noélie Delahaie & Richard Duhautois, 2013. "L'impact des dispositifs collectifs de partage des bénéfices sur les rémunérations en France. Une analyse empirique sur la période 1999-2007," Working Papers halshs-00967479, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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