Commentary. Reforming teachers' pay: incentive payments, collegiate ethos and UK policy
We examine the economic rationale for the expansion of incentive pay for school-teachers in England and Wales. While incentive pay usually improves performance in terms of targeted output, research also suggests that dysfunctional behaviour is likely, particularly in occupations with multiple goals such as teaching. We develop an economic analysis of the 'threat to collegiate ethos' argument of those opposing increased use of incentive pay. This analysis suggests that the presence of asymmetric information, externalities and teamwork effects can provide a rationale for encouraging professional motivation. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 27 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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