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Commentary. Reforming teachers' pay: incentive payments, collegiate ethos and UK policy

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  • Nick Adnett

Abstract

We examine the economic rationale for the expansion of incentive pay for school-teachers in England and Wales. While incentive pay usually improves performance in terms of targeted output, research also suggests that dysfunctional behaviour is likely, particularly in occupations with multiple goals such as teaching. We develop an economic analysis of the 'threat to collegiate ethos' argument of those opposing increased use of incentive pay. This analysis suggests that the presence of asymmetric information, externalities and teamwork effects can provide a rationale for encouraging professional motivation. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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  • Nick Adnett, 2003. "Commentary. Reforming teachers' pay: incentive payments, collegiate ethos and UK policy," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 145-157, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:27:y:2003:i:1:p:145-157
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Belfield & David Marsden, 2006. "Pay for Performance Where Output is Hard to Measure: the Case of Performance Pay for School Teachers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0747, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Marsden, David & Belfield, Richard, 2006. "Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 22871, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Nick Adnett & Peter Davies, 2005. "Competition between or within schools? Re-assessing school choice," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 109-121.

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