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Teacher Incentives and Student Performance: Evidence from Brazil

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  • Andrea Lepine

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on a large-scale teacher incentive program in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, which awarded group bonuses to teachers and school staff conditional on improvements in student performance. By using a difference-in-differences and triple-differences framework, I show that the program had overall positive effects on student achievement, although improvements vary across grades and subjects. The robustness of the results is assessed through the use of a series of alternative counterfactuals. I also investigate whether initial school characteristics affect the impact of the program. Although it could be expected that free-riding effects increase with the number of teachers in schools, therefore limiting the impact of the program, this does not seem to be the case. More sizeable differences are found according to school's previous performance. Initially low-performing schools improved much more than the average, suggesting there may be considerable differences in the ability of schools to respond to this type of policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Lepine, 2016. "Teacher Incentives and Student Performance: Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2016_18, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
  • Handle: RePEc:spa:wpaper:2016wpecon18
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pay for performance; Student achievement; Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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