Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.1979
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- Victor Lavy, 2004. "Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity and Grading Ethics," NBER Working Papers 10622, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
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