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Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability

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  • Derek Neal

    (University of Chicago and NBER)

  • Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach

    (University of Chicago and NBER)

Abstract

We show that within the Chicago Public Schools, both the introduction of NCLB in 2002 and the introduction of similar district-level reforms in 1996 generated noteworthy increases in reading and math scores among students in the middle of the achievement distribution but not among the least academically advantaged students. The stringency of proficiency requirements varied among the programs implemented for different grades in different years, and our results suggest that changes in proficiency requirements induce teachers to shift more attention to students who are near the current proficiency standard. © 2010 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Derek Neal & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010. "Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 263-283, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:92:y:2010:i:2:p:263-283
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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