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The effects of School Accountability on Teacher Mobility and Teacher Sorting

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  • Gjefsen, Hege Marie
  • Gunnes, Trude

Abstract

Does school accountability change the teacher composition in schools? We exploit a nested school accountability reform to estimate the causal effect of accountability on teacher mobility and teacher sorting. In 2003, lower secondary schools in Oslo became formally accountable to the school district authority. In 2005, a value added measure of student achievement in lower secondary schools also became public information. Both when using a double and a triple difference estimator, we find significantly increased teacher mobility. Almost all teachers that moved left the teaching sector entirely. Non-stayers were largely replaced by high-ability teachers, yielding a positive sorting effect after the second part of the reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Gjefsen, Hege Marie & Gunnes, Trude, 2016. "The effects of School Accountability on Teacher Mobility and Teacher Sorting," MPRA Paper 69664, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:69664
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Karbownik, Krzysztof, 2020. "The effects of student composition on teacher turnover: Evidence from an admission reform," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    school accountability; teacher turnover; teacher sorting; difference-in-difference-in-difference;

    JEL classification:

    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor

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