Testing, Crime and Punishment
The recent passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 solidified a national trend toward increased student testing for the purpose of evaluating public schools. This new environment for schools provides strong incentives for schools to alter the ways in which they deliver educational services. This paper investigates whether schools may employ discipline for misbehavior as a tool to bolster aggregate test performance. To do so, this paper utilizes an extraordinary dataset constructed from the school district administrative records of a subset of the school districts in Florida during the four years surrounding the introduction of a high-stakes testing regime. It compare the suspensions of students involved in each of the 41,803 incidents in which two students were suspended and where prior year test scores for both students are observed. While schools always tend to assign harsher punishments to low-performing students than to high-performing students throughout the year, this gap grows substantially during the testing window. Moreover, this testing window-related gap is only observed for students in testing grades. In summary, schools apparent act on the incentive to re-shape the testing pool through selective discipline in response to accountability pressures.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Figlio, David N. "Testing, Crime And Punishment," Journal of Public Economics, 2006, v90(4-5,May), 837-851.|
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- David N. Figlio & Joshua Winicki, 2002.
"Food for Thought: The Effects of School Accountability Plans on School Nutrition,"
NBER Working Papers
9319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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0601, Barnard College, Department of Economics.
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- Brian A. Jacob & Lars Lefgren, 2003.
"Are Idle Hands the Devil's Workshop? Incapacitation, Concentration and Juvenile Crime,"
NBER Working Papers
9653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brian A. Jacob & Lars Lefgren, 2003. "Are Idle Hands the Devil's Workshop? Incapacitation, Concentration, and Juvenile Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1560-1577, December.
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