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Does it pay to get an A? School resource allocations in response to accountability ratings

  • Craig, Steven G.
  • Imberman, Scott A.
  • Perdue, Adam

This paper examines public school district budgetary responses to school accountability ratings. We identify school district budgetary changes through a “rating shock” due to a major change in school accountability systems in Texas. Texas implemented a new accountability system and new exam, and allowed schools a “gap” year to adjust to the new test. Using the new Texas exam as an exogenous change, we find a 1.5% increase in instructional budgets, mainly for teachers, as a response to a drop in rating. This increase is found to disappear within 3years, suggesting temporary budget support to “learn” the new system but no long run institutional change.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Urban Economics.

Volume (Year): 73 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 30-42

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Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:73:y:2013:i:1:p:30-42
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905

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  1. Figlio, David N. & Rouse, Cecilia Elena, 2006. "Do accountability and voucher threats improve low-performing schools?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 239-255, January.
  2. Randall Reback & Julie Berry Cullen, 2006. "Tinkering toward accolades: School gaming under a performance accountability system," Working Papers 0601, Barnard College, Department of Economics.
  3. Hanley Chiang, 2009. "How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement," Mathematica Policy Research Reports c58a3b537e324447b94a2bd41, Mathematica Policy Research.
  4. Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, 2005. "Does school accountability lead to improved student performance?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(2), pages 297-327.
  5. Rajashri Chakrabarti, 2005. "Vouchers, Public School Response and the Role of Incentives: Evidence from Florida," Public Economics 0512002, EconWPA.
  6. Chakrabarti Rajashri, 2013. "Impact of Voucher Design on Public School Performance: Evidence from Florida and Milwaukee Voucher Programs," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 349-394, July.
  7. David N. Figlio, 2005. "Testing, Crime and Punishment," NBER Working Papers 11194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. David N. Figlio & Maurice E. Lucas, 2004. "What's in a Grade? School Report Cards and the Housing Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 591-604, June.
  9. Randall Reback, 2006. "Teaching to the Rating: School Accountability and the Distribution of Student Achievement," Working Papers 0602, Barnard College, Department of Economics.
  10. Jacob, Brian A., 2005. "Accountability, incentives and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago Public Schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 761-796, June.
  11. Chiang, Hanley, 2009. "How accountability pressure on failing schools affects student achievement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1045-1057, October.
  12. Marigee Bacolod & John DiNardo & Mireille Jacobson, 2009. "Beyond Incentives: Do Schools use Accountability Rewards Productively?," NBER Working Papers 14775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. repec:mpr:mprres:6364 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. David N. Figlio & Joshua Winicki, 2002. "Food for Thought: The Effects of School Accountability Plans on School Nutrition," NBER Working Papers 9319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Jonah E. Rockoff & Lesley J. Turner, 2008. "Short Run Impacts of Accountability on School Quality," NBER Working Papers 14564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, 2004. "The Effect of School Accountability Systems on the Level and Distribution of Student Achievement," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 406-415, 04/05.
  17. Figlio, David N. & Kenny, Lawrence W., 2009. "Public sector performance measurement and stakeholder support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1069-1077, October.
  18. Derek Neal & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010. "Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 263-283, May.
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