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School Responsiveness to Quality Rankings: An Empirical Analysis of Secondary Education in the Netherlands

Author

Listed:
  • Koning, Pierre

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • van der Wiel, Karen

    (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the response of secondary schools to changes in their quality ratings. The current analysis is the first to address the impact of quality scores that have been published by a newspaper (Trouw), rather than public interventions. Our research design exploits the substantial lags in the registration and publication of the Trouw scores and that takes into account all possible outcomes of the ratings, instead of the lowest category only. Overall, we find evidence that school quality performance does respond to Trouw quality scores. Both average grades increase and the number of diplomas go up after receiving a negative score. For schools that receive the most negative ranking, the short-term effects (one year after a change in the ranking of schools) of quality transparency on final exam grades equal 10% to 30% of a standard deviation compared to the average of this variable. The estimated long run impacts are roughly equal to the short-term effects that are measured.

Suggested Citation

  • Koning, Pierre & van der Wiel, Karen, 2010. "School Responsiveness to Quality Rankings: An Empirical Analysis of Secondary Education in the Netherlands," IZA Discussion Papers 4969, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4969
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Publish school rankings, and bad schools improve
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-06-24 19:01:00
    2. School Report Cards Work
      by Alex Tabarrok in Marginal Revolution on 2011-02-26 18:01:00
    3. School Report Cards Work
      by Alex Tabarrok in Cafe Hayek on 2011-02-26 18:01:00

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Camargo, Braz & Camelo, Rafael & Firpo, Sergio & Ponczek, Vladimir, 2014. "Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 7941, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Atsuyoshi MOROZUMI & Ryuichi TANAKA, 2023. "School Accountability and Student Achievement: Neighboring schools matter," Discussion papers 23004, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    3. Steven F. Lehrer & R. Vincent Pohl & Kyungchul Song, 2022. "Multiple Testing and the Distributional Effects of Accountability Incentives in Education," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(4), pages 1552-1568, October.
    4. De Witte, Kristof & Geys, Benny & Solondz, Catharina, 2014. "Public expenditures, educational outcomes and grade inflation: Theory and evidence from a policy intervention in the Netherlands," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 152-166.
    5. Koning, Pierre & van der Wiel, Karen, 2010. "Ranking the Schools: How Quality Information Affects School Choice in the Netherlands," IZA Discussion Papers 4984, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Morozumi, Atsuyoshi & Tanaka, Ryuichi, 2020. "Should School-Level Results of National Assessments Be Made Public?," IZA Discussion Papers 13450, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Nunes, Luis C. & Reis, Ana Balcão & Seabra, Carmo, 2015. "The publication of school rankings: A step toward increased accountability?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 15-23.
    8. Yuta Kuroda, 2022. "What does the disclosure of school quality information bring? The effect through the housing market," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 125-149, January.
    9. Borghans Lex & Golsteyn Bart H. H. & Zölitz Ulf, 2015. "Parental Preferences for Primary School Characteristics," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 85-117, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    school accountability; school quality;

    JEL classification:

    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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