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Beyond Incentives: Do Schools Use Accountability Rewards Productively?

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  • Marigee Bacolod
  • John DiNardo
  • Mireille Jacobson

Abstract

We use a regression discontinuity design to analyze an understudied aspect of school accountability systems—how schools use financial rewards. For two years, California's accountability system financially rewarded schools based on a deterministic function of test scores. Qualifying schools received per-pupil awards amounting to about 1% of statewide per-pupil spending. Corroborating anecdotal evidence that awards were paid out as teacher bonuses, we find no evidence that winning schools purchased more instructional material, increased teacher hiring, or changed the subject-specific composition of their teaching staff. Most importantly, we find no evidence that student achievement increased in winning schools. Supplemental materials for this article are available online.

Suggested Citation

  • Marigee Bacolod & John DiNardo & Mireille Jacobson, 2011. "Beyond Incentives: Do Schools Use Accountability Rewards Productively?," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(1), pages 149-163, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jnlbes:v:30:y:2011:i:1:p:149-163
    DOI: 10.1080/07350015.2012.637868
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    1. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2009. "Regression Discontinuity Designs In Economics," Working Papers 1118, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    2. Kenneth Y. Chay & Patrick J. McEwan & Miguel Urquiola, 2005. "The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1237-1258, September.
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    4. Cecilia Elena Rouse & Jane Hannaway & Dan Goldhaber & David Figlio, 2013. "Feeling the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 251-281, May.
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    6. Cecilia Elena Rouse & Jane Hannaway & Dan Goldhaber & David Figlio, 2013. "Feeling the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 251-281, May.
    7. repec:pri:edures:24ers.pdf is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:mpr:mprres:4987 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Marigee Bacolod & John DiNardo & Mireille Jacobson, 2012. "Beyond Incentives: Do Schools Use Accountability Rewards Productively?," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(1), pages 149-163.
    10. repec:pri:cepsud:156rouse is not listed on IDEAS
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    2. Camargo, Braz & Camelo, Rafael & Firpo, Sergio & Ponczek, Vladimir, 2014. "Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 7941, IZA Network @ LISER.
    3. Lara Fleck & Melline Somers & Tom Stolp & Wim Groot & Frits Merode & Ralph Vries, 2025. "The Effectiveness of Interventions to Increase Employment in Education and Healthcare: A Systematic Literature Review," De Economist, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 1-45, March.
    4. Susanna Loeb & Patrick J. McEwan, 2010. "Education Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Targeting Investments in Children: Fighting Poverty When Resources Are Limited, pages 145-178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Pierre Koning & Karen Wiel, 2012. "School Responsiveness to Quality Rankings: An Empirical Analysis of Secondary Education in the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 339-355, December.
    6. Marigee Bacolod & John DiNardo & Mireille Jacobson, 2012. "Beyond Incentives: Do Schools Use Accountability Rewards Productively?," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(1), pages 149-163.
    7. Rebecca Allen & Simon Burgess & Leigh McKenna, 2010. "How should we treat under-performing schools? A regression discontinuity analysis of school inspections in England," DoQSS Working Papers 10-20, Quantitative Social Science - UCL Social Research Institute, University College London.
    8. Ginger Zhe Jin & Alex Whalley, 2007. "The Power of Attention: Do Rankings Affect the Financial Resources of Public Colleges?," NBER Working Papers 12941, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Holbein, John B. & Ladd, Helen F., 2017. "Accountability pressure: Regression discontinuity estimates of how No Child Left Behind influenced student behavior," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 55-67.
    10. Craig, Steven G. & Imberman, Scott A. & Perdue, Adam, 2013. "Does it pay to get an A? School resource allocations in response to accountability ratings," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-42.
    11. Craig, Steven G. & Imberman, Scott A. & Perdue, Adam, 2013. "Does it pay to get an A? School resource allocations in response to accountability ratings," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-42.
    12. Chakrabarti, Rajashri, 2014. "Incentives and responses under No Child Left Behind: Credible threats and the role of competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 124-146.
    13. Craig, Steven G. & Imberman, Scott A. & Perdue, Adam, 2015. "Do administrators respond to their accountability ratings? The response of school budgets to accountability grades," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 55-68.
    14. World Bank, 2012. "Nigeria : Anambra Teachers," World Bank Publications - Reports 17674, The World Bank Group.
    15. World Bank, 2012. "Nigeria : Ekiti Teachers," World Bank Publications - Reports 17668, The World Bank Group.
    16. Seunghoon Han & Hosung Sohn, 2020. "Impact of the Simultaneous Use of the Stigmatization and Categorical School Funding Policy on the Test and Post-Secondary Outcomes of Lower-Achieving Students," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 36, pages 319-352.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • I0 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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