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Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance


  • Camargo, Braz

    () (Sao Paulo School of Economics)

  • Camelo, Rafael

    () (Sao Paulo School of Economics)

  • Firpo, Sergio

    () (Insper, São Paulo)

  • Ponczek, Vladimir

    () (Sao Paulo School of Economics)


This paper uses a discontinuity on the test score disclosure rules of the National Secondary Education Examination in Brazil to test whether test score disclosure affects student performance, the composition of students in schools, and school observable inputs. We find that test score disclosure has a heterogeneous impact on test scores, but only increases average test scores in private schools. Since test score disclosure has no impact on student composition and school observable inputs in both public and private schools, our results suggest that test score disclosure changes the behavior of teachers and school managers in private schools by affecting the market incentives faced by such schools. We also develop a model of school and student behavior to help explain our empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Camargo, Braz & Camelo, Rafael & Firpo, Sergio & Ponczek, Vladimir, 2014. "Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 7941, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7941

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Jonah Rockoff & Lesley J. Turner, 2010. "Short-Run Impacts of Accountability on School Quality," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 119-147, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:6:p:1535-63 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Firpo, Sergio & Ponczek, Vladimir & Possebom, Vítor Augusto, 2014. "Private Education Market, Information on Test Scores and Tuition Practices," IZA Discussion Papers 8476, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Andrea Lépine, 2015. "School Reputation and School Choice in Brazil: a Regression Discontinuity Design," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2015_38, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    4. Machado, Cecilia & Szerman, Christiane, 2016. "Centralized Admission and the Student-College Match," IZA Discussion Papers 10251, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item


    test score disclosure; market incentives; public and private schools;

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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