Test-Based Accountability and Student Achievement: An Investigation of Differential Performance on NAEP and State Assessments
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Cited by:
- Gregg, John J. & Lavertu, Stéphane, 2023. "Test-based accountability and educational equity: Breaking through local district politics?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
- Richardson, J.T., 2015. "Accountability incentives and academic achievement: Distributional impacts of accountability when standards are set low," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-16.
- Fitzpatrick, Maria D. & Grissmer, David & Hastedt, Sarah, 2011.
"What a difference a day makes: Estimating daily learning gains during kindergarten and first grade using a natural experiment,"
Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 269-279, April.
- Maria Fitzpatrick & David Grissmer & Sarah Hastedt, 2009. "What a Differense a Day Makes: Estimating Daily Learning Gains During Kindergarten and First Grade Using a Natural Experiment," Discussion Papers 08-050, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Huang, Bin & Li, Bo & Walker, Ian & Zhu, Yu, 2022. "Does It Pay to Attend More Selective High Schools? Regression Discontinuity Evidence from China," IZA Discussion Papers 15756, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Mizala, Alejandra & Urquiola, Miguel, 2013.
"School markets: The impact of information approximating schools' effectiveness,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 313-335.
- Alejandra Mizala & Miguel Urquiola, 2007. "School Markets: The Impact of Information Approximating Schools' Effectiveness," NBER Working Papers 13676, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zhang, Hongliang, 2016. "Identification of treatment effects under imperfect matching with an application to Chinese elite schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 56-82.
- Nicholas J. Sanders, 2012.
"What Doesn’t Kill You Makes You Weaker: Prenatal Pollution Exposure and Educational Outcomes,"
Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 47(3), pages 826-850.
- Nicholas J. Sanders, 2011. "What Doesn't Kill you Makes you Weaker: Prenatal Pollution Exposure and Educational Outcomes," Discussion Papers 10-019, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Chiang, Hanley, 2009. "How accountability pressure on failing schools affects student achievement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1045-1057, October.
- Alejandra Mizala & Miguel Urquiola, 2007. "Parental choice and school markets: The impact of information approximating school effectiveness," Documentos de Trabajo 239, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EDU-2007-01-23 (Education)
- NEP-URE-2007-01-23 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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