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School accountability laws and the consumption of psychostimulants

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  • Bokhari, Farasat A.S.
  • Schneider, Helen

Abstract

Abstract Over the past decade, several states introduced varying degrees of accountability systems for schools, which became federal law with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. The intent of these accountability laws was to improve academic performance and to make school quality more observable. Nonetheless, schools have reacted to these pressures in several different ways, some of which were not intended. We make use of the variation across states and over time in specific provisions of these accountability laws and find that accountability pressures effect medical diagnoses and subsequent treatment options of school aged children. Specifically, children in states with more stringent accountability laws are more likely to be diagnosed with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and consequently prescribed psychostimulant drugs for controlling the symptoms. However, conditional on diagnosis, accountability laws do not further change the probability of receiving medication therapy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bokhari, Farasat A.S. & Schneider, Helen, 2011. "School accountability laws and the consumption of psychostimulants," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 355-372, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:30:y:2011:i:2:p:355-372
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Farasat A. S. Bokhari & Gary M. Fournier, 2013. "Entry in the ADHD drugs market: Welfare impact of generics and me-too's," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 339-392, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Chorniy & Janet Currie & Lyudmyla Sonchak, 2017. "Exploding Asthma and ADHD Caseloads: The Role of Medicaid Managed Care," NBER Working Papers 23983, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bertoni, Marco & Brunello, Giorgio & Rocco, Lorenzo, 2013. "When the cat is near, the mice won't play: The effect of external examiners in Italian schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 65-77.
    3. Brun, Cédric & Demazeux, Steeves & Vittorio, Pierangelo Di & Gonon, François & Gorry, Philippe & Konsman, Jan Peter & Lung, Fanny & Lung, Yannick & Minard, Michel & Montalban, Matthieu & Rumeau, Nicol, 2015. "La construction des catégories diagnostiques de maladie mentale," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
    4. Farasat A. S. Bokhari & Gary M. Fournier, 2013. "Entry in the ADHD drugs market: Welfare impact of generics and me-too's," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 339-392, June.
    5. Patricia M. Anderson & Kristin F. Butcher & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2017. "Adequate (or Adipose?) Yearly Progress: Assessing the Effect of “No Child Left Behind” on Children's Obesity," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 12(1), pages 54-76, Winter.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ADD/ADHD Psychostimulants School accountability laws;

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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