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Performance Standards and Employee Effort: Evidence from Teacher Absences

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  • Seth Gershenson

    () (American University)

Abstract

The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) increased accountability pressure in U.S. public schools by threatening to impose sanctions on Title 1 schools that failed to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) in consecutive years. Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of failing AYP in the first year of NCLB on teacher effort in the subsequent year suggest that, on average, teacher absences in North Carolina fell by about 10 percent, and the probability of being absent 15 or more times fell by about 30 percent. Reductions in teacher absences were driven by within-teacher increases in effort and were larger among more effective teachers.

Suggested Citation

  • Seth Gershenson, 2015. "Performance Standards and Employee Effort: Evidence from Teacher Absences," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles 15-217, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:upj:weupjo:15-217
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Performance standards; employee effort; teacher absences; accountability No Child Left Behind;

    JEL classification:

    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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