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Entry in the ADHD drugs market: Welfare impact of generics and me-too's

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  • Farasat A. S. Bokhari
  • Gary M. Fournier

Abstract

Recent years have seen the growing popularity of drugs designed to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and the number of patients, scripts, and revenues has been steadily increasing. By the mid-1990s there were already several branded drugs marketed for this disorder, as well as numerous generic formulations. With the expansion of the market in the late 1990s and early 2000s, new formulations (the so called `me-too' drugs) entered and caused dramatic changes in the distribution of market shares among available drugs. Using detailed sales data on psychostimulant drugs used to treat ADHD, we are able to identify and measure substitution patterns across a range of drugs. We find that the demand for ADHD drugs is fairly elastic and there are significant substitution possibilities among these drugs. Using estimates from demand parameters, we show that the first-time introduction of a generic drug can have large welfare gains due to the expansion of the market to price sensitive consumers. Additionally, the welfare gains due to the introduction of me-too drugs vary by the novelty of the drug, and for significantly new varieties can be larger than those of the introduction of a generic. Our results bear policy implications for both the speed with which new drugs are approved for marketing as well as for actions among pharmaceutical firms that may delay the entry of a generic drug.
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  • Farasat A. S. Bokhari & Gary M. Fournier, 2013. "Entry in the ADHD drugs market: Welfare impact of generics and me-too's," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 339-392, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:61:y:2013:i:2:p:339-392
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    3. Bokhari, Farasat A.S. & Mariuzzo, Franco, 2018. "Demand estimation and merger simulations for drugs: Logits v. AIDS," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 653-685.
    4. Gugler, Klaus & Szücs, Florian, 2023. "Market Power and Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 343, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    5. Bokhari, Farasat A.S. & Schneider, Helen, 2011. "School accountability laws and the consumption of psychostimulants," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 355-372, March.
    6. Tomaso Duso & Annika Herr & Moritz Suppliet, 2014. "The Welfare Impact Of Parallel Imports: A Structural Approach Applied To The German Market For Oral Anti‐Diabetics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(9), pages 1036-1057, September.
    7. Keaton Miller & Boyoung Seo, 2021. "The Effect of Cannabis Legalization on Substance Demand and Tax Revenues," National Tax Journal, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 107-145.
    8. Lee Branstetter & Chirantan Chatterjee & Matthew J. Higgins, 2016. "Regulation and welfare: evidence from paragraph IV generic entry in the pharmaceutical industry," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(4), pages 857-890, November.
    9. Gilad Sorek, 2015. "Health Insurance and Competition in Health Care Markets," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2015-03, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    10. Arcidiacono, Peter & Ellickson, Paul B. & Landry, Peter & Ridley, David B., 2013. "Pharmaceutical followers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 538-553.
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    13. Sarmah, Archita & De Giovanni, Domenico & De Giovanni, Pietro, 2020. "Compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical industry: Pricing and R&D strategies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(3), pages 1053-1069.
    14. Callejas, Jerónimo & Mohapatra, Debi Prasad, 2021. "Welfare effects of public procurement of medicines: Evidence from Ecuador," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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