“Branded Generics” As A Strategy To Limit Cannibalization Of Pharmaceutical Markets
This paper demonstrates how, by introducing a generic version of its previously-patented product, a branded firm can influence the equilibrium in the generic segment of the market for the product. This in turn can increase the firm’s profits from selling the branded version. We then use structural estimates from previous literature to calculate the magnitude of the effects in the generic and branded segments.
|Date of creation:||May 2005|
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- Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1995.
"Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals,"
NBER Working Papers
5306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ying Kong & James R. Seldon, 2004. "Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 71-86, 08.
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