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Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters

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  • Rothstein, Jesse

Abstract

Recent proposals would strengthen the dependence of teacher pay and retention on performance, in order to attract those who will be effective teachers and repel those who will not. I model the teacher labor market, incorporating dynamic self-selection, noisy performance measurement, and Bayesian learning. Simulations indicate that labor market interactions are important to the evaluation of alternative teacher contracts. Typical bonus policies have very small effects on selection. Firing policies can have larger effects, if accompanied by substantial salary increases. However, misalignment between productivity and measured performance nearly eliminates the benefits while preserving most of the costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Rothstein, Jesse, 2012. "Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt81q0f4bc, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt81q0f4bc
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Teachers; Education; Teacher quality; Evaluation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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