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Playing with the Good Guys: A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation

Author

Listed:
  • Brekke, Kjell Arne

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Hauge, Karen Evely

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Lind, Jo Thori

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Nyborg, Karine

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

Abstract

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start o high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a xed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees.

Suggested Citation

  • Brekke, Kjell Arne & Hauge, Karen Evely & Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine, 2009. "Playing with the Good Guys: A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation," Memorandum 08/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2009_008
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    File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2009/Memo-08-2009.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Altruism; conditional cooperation; self-selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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