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Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services

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  • Nava Ashraf
  • Oriana Bandiera
  • Edward Davenport
  • Scott S. Lee

Abstract

We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new health care position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off exists only at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25 percent decrease in child malnutrition.

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  • Nava Ashraf & Oriana Bandiera & Edward Davenport & Scott S. Lee, 2020. "Losing Prosociality in the Quest for Talent? Sorting, Selection, and Productivity in the Delivery of Public Services," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1355-1394, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:5:p:1355-94
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180326
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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