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Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

Author

Listed:
  • Leaver,Clare
  • Ozier,Owen
  • Serneels,Pieter Maria
  • Zeitlin,Andrew

Abstract

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Leaver,Clare & Ozier,Owen & Serneels,Pieter Maria & Zeitlin,Andrew, 2020. "Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9395, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9395
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    Cited by:

    1. Renata Lemos & Karthik Muralidharan & Daniela Scur, 2024. "Personnel Management and School Productivity: Evidence from India," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(661), pages 2071-2100.
    2. Jörg L. Spenkuch & Edoardo Teso & Guo Xu, 2023. "Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1171-1203, July.
    3. Balbuzanov, Ivan & Gars, Jared & Stalinski, Mateusz & Tjernstrom, Emilia, 2025. "Incentivizing Engagement : Experimental Evidence on Journalist Performance Pay," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1570, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Evans, David K. & Yuan, Fei & Filmer, Deon, 2022. "Teacher pay in Africa: Evidence from 15 countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    5. Balbuzanov, Ivan & Gars, Jared & Stalinski, Mateusz & Tjernström, Emilia, 2025. "Incentivizing Engagement: Experimental Evidence on Journalist Performance Pay," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 763, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    6. Matteo Bobba & Tim Ederer & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta & Christopher A. Neilson & Marco Nieddu, 2021. "Teacher compensation and structural inequality: Evidence from centralized teacher school choice in Perú," Economics Working Papers 1788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Dustan, Andrew & Hernandez-Agramonte, Juan Manuel & Maldonado, Stanislao, 2023. "Motivating bureaucrats with behavioral insights when state capacity is weak: Evidence from large-scale field experiments in Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    8. Florian Englmaier & Gerd Muehlheusser & Andreas Roider & Niklas Wallmeier, 2022. "Management and Performance in the Public Sector: Evidence from German Municipalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 10060, CESifo.
    9. Courtney Bell & Jessalynn James & Eric S. Taylor & James Wyckoff, 2025. "Measuring returns to experience using supervisor ratings of observed performance: The case of classroom teachers," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(1), pages 12-44, January.
    10. Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 371-402.
    11. Yue-Yi Hwa & Clare Leaver, 2021. "Management in education systems," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 367-391.
    12. Brutti, Zelda & Sánchez Torres, Fabio, 2022. "Turning around teacher quality in Latin America: Renewed confidence and lessons from Colombia," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 62-93.
    13. Singh, Abhijeet & Berg, Petter, 2024. "Myths of official measurement: Limits to test-based education reforms with weak governance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    14. Gulzar, Saad & Ladino, Juan Felipe & Mehmood, Muhammad Zia & Rogger, Daniel, 2025. "Command and Can’t Control : Assessing Centralized Accountability in the Public Sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 11200, The World Bank.
    15. Liu, Kevin Zhengcheng & Zhang, Xiaoming, 2025. "Discretion, talent allocation, and governance performance: Evidence from China’s imperial bureaucracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    16. Clare Leaver & Owen Ozier & Pieter Serneels & Andrew Zeitlin, 2021. "Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(7), pages 2213-2246, July.
    17. Alfonso, Mariana & Busso, Matias & Ñopo, Hugo & Rivera, Antonella & Yentzen, Triana, 2025. "Becoming a teacher: Experimental evidence from an information intervention," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    18. Philipp Barteska & Jay Euijung Lee, 2024. "Bureaucrats and the Korean export miracle," Discussion Papers 2024-11, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    19. Crawfurd, Lee, 2021. "Accounting for repetition and dropout in contemporaneous cross-section learning profiles: Evidence from Rwanda," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    20. Biasi, Barbara & Sandholtz, Wayne Aaron, 2025. "The Political Consequences of Controversial Education Reform: Lessons from Wisconsin’s Act 10," IZA Discussion Papers 17836, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Emma Duchini & Victor Lavy & Stephen Machin & Shqiponja Telhaj, 2025. "Personnel policy in public sector organizations: evidence from England's academy schools," CEP Discussion Papers dp2129, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    22. Hossain, Saira, 2025. "Teacher absenteeism, large class size, and performance pressure: Barriers to student well-being at secondary schools in Bangladesh," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    23. Aisha J Ali & Javier Fuenzalida & Margarita Gómez & Martin J Williams, 2021. "Four lenses on people management in the public sector: an evidence review and synthesis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 335-366.
    24. Philipp Barteska & Jay Euijung Lee, 2025. "Personnel is policy (implementation): Bureaucrats and the Korean export miracle," CEP Discussion Papers dp2099, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    25. Mitchell Hoffman & Christopher T. Stanton, 2024. "People, Practices, and Productivity: A Review of New Advances in Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 32849, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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