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Incentivizing Engagement : Experimental Evidence on Journalist Performance Pay

Author

Listed:
  • Balbuzanov, Ivan

    (Department of Economics, University of Melbourne)

  • Gars, Jared

    (Food and Resource Economics Department, University of Florida)

  • Stalinski, Mateusz

    (University of Warwick and CAGE)

  • Tjernstrom, Emilia

    (Macquarie University)

Abstract

Digital platforms increasingly compensate content creators based on engagement metrics, yet the effects of these incentives remain poorly understood. We conducted a field experiment with a Kenyan news outlet to study how high-intensity performance incentives affect content production, quality, and journalist well-being in digital media. We randomly assigned writers to either pay-per-click (PPC) or piece-rate contracts. The PPC contract tripled per-article pageviews and increased daily pageviews by 107%, but reduced the number of published articles by 74%. While PPC writers earned more per article, their overall earnings fell, lowering the firm’s wage bill and increasing profits. However, these gains came at a cost : PPC writers shifted content production away from local news and towards attention-grabbing political stories. PPC writers also used less positive language in both headlines and article bodies. Our results show that engagement-based pay boosts reader traffic but caution that this may come at the cost of compromised coverage diversity, local news provision, and journalist well-being.

Suggested Citation

  • Balbuzanov, Ivan & Gars, Jared & Stalinski, Mateusz & Tjernstrom, Emilia, 2025. "Incentivizing Engagement : Experimental Evidence on Journalist Performance Pay," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1570, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1570
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2025/twerp_1570-_stalinski.pdf
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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