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Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs

  • Grant Miller
  • Kimberly Singer Babiarz
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    This chapter surveys experience with performance pay in developing country health programs. In doing so, it focuses on four key conceptual issues: (1) What to reward, (2) Who to reward, (3) How to reward, and (4) What unintended consequences might performance incentives create. We highlight that the use of performance pay has outpaced growth in corresponding empirical evidence. Moreover, very little research on performance incentives focuses on the underlying conceptual issues that we outline. We consider these to be important constraints to the design of better performance incentives in low- and middle-income country health programs.

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    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18932.

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    Date of creation: Apr 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18932
    Note: DEV HC HE
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