Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab
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- Pablo Brassiolo & Ricardo Estrada & Gustavo Fajardo & Juan F. Vargas, 2020. "Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab," Documentos de Trabajo LACEA 018182, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA.
- Brassiolo, P & Estrada, R & Fajardo, G & Vargas, J. F, 2020. "Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab," Documentos de Trabajo 018179, Universidad del Rosario.
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More about this item
Keywords
Corrupción;JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2020-05-18 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2020-05-18 (Experimental Economics)
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