Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in deregulated social health insurance: Which is more effective?
Microeconomic theory predicts that if patients are fully insured and providers are paid fee-for-service, utilization of medical services exceeds the efficient level (‘moral hazard effect’). In Switzerland, both demand-side and supply-side cost sharing have been introduced to mitigate this problem. Analyzing a panel dataset of about 160,000 adults, we find both types of cost sharing to be effective in curtailing the use of medical services. However, when moral hazard mitigation is traded off against risk selection, the minimum-deductible, supply-side cost sharing option ranks first, followed by the medium-deductible demand-side alternative, making the supply-side option somewhat more effective.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 31 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Schellhorn, 2001. "The effect of variable health insurance deductibles on the demand for physician visits," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(5), pages 441-456.
- Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Durand, Franck & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves, 1998.
"Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 499-511, May.
- Chiappori, P.A. & Durand, F. & Geoffard, P.Y., 1998. "Moral Hazard and the Demand for Physician Services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment," DELTA Working Papers 98-05, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Lehmann, Hansjorg & Zweifel, Peter, 2004. "Innovation and risk selection in deregulated social health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 997-1012, September.
- James J. Heckman, 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models," NBER Chapters,in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4, pages 475-492 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wolfe, John R. & Goddeeris, John H., 1991. "Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the medigap insurance market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 433-459.
- Manning, Willard G., 1998. "The logged dependent variable, heteroscedasticity, and the retransformation problem," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 283-295, June.
- Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
- Murat K. Munkin & Partha Deb & Pravin K. Trivedi, 2006. "Bayesian analysis of the two-part model with endogeneity: application to health care expenditure," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(7), pages 1081-1099.
- Rainer Winkelmann, 2004.
"Co-payments for prescription drugs and the demand for doctor visits - Evidence from a natural experiment,"
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(11), pages 1081-1089.
- Rainer Winkelmann, 2003. "Co-Payments for Prescription Drugs and the Demand for Doctor Visits - Evidence from a Natural Experiment," SOI - Working Papers 0307, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
- Dowd, Bryan, et al, 1991. "Health Plan Choice and the Utilization of Health Care Services," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(1), pages 85-93, February.
- Gourieroux, Christian & Monfort, Alain & Renault, Eric & Trognon, Alain, 1987. "Generalised residuals," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 5-32.
- Vella, Francis, 1993. "A Simple Estimator for Simultaneous Models with Censored Endogenous Regressors," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 441-457, May.
- Vella, F., 1989. "A Simple Estimator For Simultaneous Models With Censored Endogenous Regressors," RCER Working Papers 199, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-151, Fall.
- Gardiol, Lucien & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Grandchamp, Chantal, 2005. "Separating Selection and Incentive Effects in Health Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 5380, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lucien Gardiol & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Chantal Grandchamp, 2005. "Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590713, HAL.
- van Kleef, R.C. & Beck, K. & van de Ven, W.P.M.M. & van Vliet, R.C.J.A., 2008. "Risk equalization and voluntary deductibles: A complex interaction," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 427-443, March.
- Andrew M. Jones, 2012. "health econometrics," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vella, Francis & Verbeek, Marno, 1999. "Two-step estimation of panel data models with censored endogenous variables and selection bias," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 239-263, June.
- Vella, F. & Verbeek, M.J.C.M., 1999. "Two-step estimation of panel data models with censored endogenous variables and selection bias," Other publications TiSEM 5aad87bc-25d1-49bc-882b-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Andreas Werblow & Stefan Felder & Peter Zweifel, 2007. "Population ageing and health care expenditure: a school of 'red herrings'?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(10), pages 1109-1126.
- Terza, Joseph V. & Basu, Anirban & Rathouz, Paul J., 2008. "Two-stage residual inclusion estimation: Addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 531-543, May.
- Francis Vella & Marno Verbeek, 1998. "Whose wages do unions raise? A dynamic model of unionism and wage rate determination for young men," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(2), pages 163-183.
- Cameron,A. Colin & Trivedi,Pravin K., 2008. "Microeconometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9787111235767, May.
- A. C. Cameron & P. K. Trivedi & Frank Milne & J. Piggott, 1988. "A Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in Australia," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 85-106.
- Edward C. Norton & Hua Wang & Chunrong Ai, 2004. "Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 4(2), pages 154-167, June.
- Blough, David K. & Madden, Carolyn W. & Hornbrook, Mark C., 1999. "Modeling risk using generalized linear models," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-171, April.
- Eichner, Matthew J, 1998. "The Demand for Medical Care: What People Pay Does Matter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 117-121, May.
- Michael Gerfin & Martin Schellhorn, 2006. "Nonparametric bounds on the effect of deductibles in health care insurance on doctor visits - Swiss evidence," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(9), pages 1011-1020.
- Gerfin, Michael & Schellhorn, Martin, 2005. "Nonparametric Bounds on the Effect of Deductibles in Health Care Insurance on Doctor Visits – Swiss Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 1616, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
- Baltagi, Badi H. & Wu, Ping X., 1999. "Unequally Spaced Panel Data Regressions With Ar(1) Disturbances," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(06), pages 814-823, December.
- Gary Chamberlain, 1980. "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 225-238.
- Lee, Lung-Fei, 1978. "Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model with Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 19(2), pages 415-433, June.
- Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
- Manning, Willard G. & Mullahy, John, 2001. "Estimating log models: to transform or not to transform?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 461-494, July.
- Willard G. Manning & John Mullahy, 1999. "Estimating Log Models: To Transform or Not to Transform?," NBER Technical Working Papers 0246, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Partha Deb & Pravin K. Trivedi, 2009. "Provider networks and primary-care signups: do they restrict the use of medical services?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(12), pages 1361-1380.
- Cardon, James H & Hendel, Igal, 2001. "Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 408-427, Autumn.
- Lancaster, Tony, 2000. "The incidental parameter problem since 1948," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 391-413, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:31:y:2012:i:1:p:231-242. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.