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De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins

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  • Philippe Batifoulier

Abstract

One of the most influential “lessons” of the moral hazard theory in health economics is that cost sharing can reduce health spending without damage on health status. This “lesson” has been enormously influential on policy makers. This paper shows that this theoretical and empirical background is deficient and leads to perverse effects: inducement of inequalities and increase in health spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Batifoulier, 2014. "De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-7, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-7
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    File URL: http://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2014/WP_EcoX_2014-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Paul Dourgnon & Florence Jusot & Romain Fantin, 2012. "Payer peut nuire à votre santé : une étude de l’impact du renoncement financier aux soins sur l’état de santé," Working Papers DT47, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Apr 2012.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aléa moral du patient; partage des coûts; accès aux soins; inégalités; approche institutionnaliste;

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • I14 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Inequality
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary

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