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Aux origines de la privatisation du financement du soin : quand la théorie de l’aléa moral rencontre le capitalisme sanitaire

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  • Batifoulier, Philippe

Abstract

La privatisation de la santé en Europe se traduit par le retrait de l’assurance santé publique, l’essor de l’assurance privée, le durcissement des mécanismes de partage des coûts avec les patients et l’accroissement des dépenses directes des ménages. Cet article analyse le processus de légitimation de cette privatisation qui s’appuie sur une représentation de la couverture maladie réduite à un problème d’incitation financière. Elle s’érige en convention sous l’effet de la convergence de la théorie économique mainstream et des intérêts du capitalisme sanitaire. Elle s’appuie sur la forte influence politique de la théorie orthodoxe de l’aléa moral en santé selon lequel faire payer le patient et réduire sa couverture n’a pas d’effet sur son état de santé. On montre que cette conception, qui nourrit le développement du marché, est faussement scientifique et dangereuse : elle accroît les inégalités tout en activant de nouvelles dépenses publiques et encourage la sécession sociale.

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  • Batifoulier, Philippe, 2015. "Aux origines de la privatisation du financement du soin : quand la théorie de l’aléa moral rencontre le capitalisme sanitaire," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
  • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2015:11196
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Batifoulier & Nicolas Da Silva & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2020. "La Sociale contre l’Etat providence. Prédation et protection sociale," CEPN Working Papers 2020-01, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
    2. Philippe Batifoulier & Bruno Boidin & Jean-Paul Domin & Amandine Rauly, 2021. "La théorie économique à l’épreuve de la covid-19. Une lecture d’économie politique de la santé [Economic theory and covid-19. A reading by the political economy of health]," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 29.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    privatisation de la santé; assurance santé; aléa moral du patient; partage des coûts; inégalités de santé; convention; capitalisme sanitaire; privatization of health care; health insurance; moral hazard; cost sharing; health inequalities; convention; health capitalism; privatización de la salud; seguro de salud; azar moral del paciente; reparto de los costos; desigualdades en materia de salud; convención; capitalismo sanitario;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;

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