IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Aux origines de la privatisation du financement du soin : quand la théorie de l’aléa moral rencontre le capitalisme sanitaire

Listed author(s):
  • Batifoulier, Philippe

La privatisation de la santé en Europe se traduit par le retrait de l’assurance santé publique, l’essor de l’assurance privée, le durcissement des mécanismes de partage des coûts avec les patients et l’accroissement des dépenses directes des ménages. Cet article analyse le processus de légitimation de cette privatisation qui s’appuie sur une représentation de la couverture maladie réduite à un problème d’incitation financière. Elle s’érige en convention sous l’effet de la convergence de la théorie économique mainstream et des intérêts du capitalisme sanitaire. Elle s’appuie sur la forte influence politique de la théorie orthodoxe de l’aléa moral en santé selon lequel faire payer le patient et réduire sa couverture n’a pas d’effet sur son état de santé. On montre que cette conception, qui nourrit le développement du marché, est faussement scientifique et dangereuse : elle accroît les inégalités tout en activant de nouvelles dépenses publiques et encourage la sécession sociale.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://regulation.revues.org/11196
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://regulation.revues.org/pdf/11196
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Association Recherche et Régulation in its journal Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs.

Volume (Year): 17 (2015)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages:

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2015:11196
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://theorie-regulation.org/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Aviva Aron-Dine & Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2013. "The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 197-222, Winter.
  2. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
  3. Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Grégoire de Lagasnerie, 2012. "Réformer le système de remboursement pour les soins de ville, une analyse par microsimulation," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 455(1), pages 89-113.
  4. John Latsis & Constantinos Repapis, 2014. "A model intervenes: the many faces of moral hazard," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(4), pages 743-760.
  5. David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, 2012. "A History of the Term “Moral Hazard”," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1051-1075, December.
  6. Amitabh Chandra & Jonathan Gruber & Robin McKnight, 2010. "Patient Cost-Sharing and Hospitalization Offsets in the Elderly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 193-213, March.
  7. Batifoulier, Philippe & Braddock, Louise & Latsis, John, 2013. "Priority setting in health care: from arbitrariness to societal values," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(01), pages 61-80, March.
  8. Boyer, Robert, 2015. "L’essor du secteur de la santé annonce-t-il un modèle de développement anthropogénétique ?," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
  9. John Nyman, 2008. "Health insurance theory: the case of the missing welfare gain," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 9(4), pages 369-380, November.
  10. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2011. "Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 115-138, Winter.
  11. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643 Elsevier.
  12. Philippe Batifoulier, 2014. "Capital santé. Quand le patient devient client," Post-Print hal-01335674, HAL.
  13. David Bardey & Agnès Couffinhal & Michel Grignon, 2003. "Efficacité et risque moral ex post en assurance maladie," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(2), pages 165-197.
  14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13551 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7044 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12299 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-280, Part I, M.
  18. Emmanuel Petit, 2009. "Le rôle des affects en économie," Post-Print hal-00650135, HAL.
  19. Dupuy, Jean-Pierre & Vercueil, Julien & Labrousse, Agnès, 2013. "Le capitalisme a besoin de se croire immortel pour exister," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 13.
  20. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12236 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Mauro Pisu, 2014. "Overcoming Vulnerabilities of Health Care Systems," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1132, OECD Publishing.
  22. Franck Bien, 2004. "Assurance maladie et risque moral ex ante. L'incidence du type de risque sanitaire," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 55(3), pages 479-488.
  23. Feldstein, Martin & Friedman, Bernard, 1977. "Tax subsidies, the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 155-178, April.
  24. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The value of health insurance: the access motive," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-152, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2015:11196. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Pascal Seppecher)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.