A History of the Term “Moral Hazard”
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Cecchetti & Schoenholtz — Moral Hazard: A Primer
by email@example.com (Mike Norman) in Mike Norman Economics on 2017-09-25 19:17:00
- Moral Hazard: A Primer
by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2017-09-25 17:57:58
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Philippe Batifoulier, 2014. "De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-7, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018.
"Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
- Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Pradhan, Shailee, 2016. "Can Group Incentives Alleviate Moral Hazard? The Role of Pro-Social Preferences," Working Papers on Finance 1610, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Nov 2016.
- Paul J. Burke, 2016.
"Undermined by Adverse Selection: Australia's Direct Action Abatement Subsidies,"
The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 35(3), pages 216-229, September.
- Paul J. Burke, 2016. "Undermined by adverse selection: Australia’s Direct Action abatement subsidies," CCEP Working Papers 1605, Centre for Climate & Energy Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Burke, Paul J., 2016. "Undermined by adverse selection: Australia’s Direct Action abatement subsidies," Working Papers 249524, Australian National University, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy.
- Mol, Jantsje M. & Botzen, W. J. Wouter & Blasch, Julia E., 2020. "Risk reduction in compulsory disaster insurance: Experimental evidence on moral hazard and financial incentives," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
- Imen Karaa, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Learning in the Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market: New Evidence from Dynamic Data," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 560-589, July.
- Michael D. Eriksen & James M. Carson, 2017. "A Burning Question: Does Arson Increase When Local House Prices Decline?," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(1), pages 7-34, March.
- Guangdong Wu & Jian Zuo & Xianbo Zhao, 2017. "Incentive Model Based on Cooperative Relationship in Sustainable Construction Projects," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(7), pages 1-20, July.
- Bixter, Michael T. & Luhmann, Christian C., 2014. "Shared losses reduce sensitivity to risk: A laboratory study of moral hazard," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 63-73.
- Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Batifoulier, Philippe, 2015. "Aux origines de la privatisation du financement du soin : quand la théorie de l’aléa moral rencontre le capitalisme sanitaire," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
- Mahito Okura, 2013. "The relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 14(2), pages 120-128, February.
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