The relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Carlos Guiné, 2014. "Global Systemically Important Insurers," EIOPA Financial Stability Report - Thematic Articles 2, EIOPA, Risks and Financial Stability Department.
- Sabau-Popa Claudia Diana & Bradea Ioana & Bolos Marcel Ioan & Delcea Camelia, 2015. "The Information Confidentiality And Cyber Security In Medical Institutions," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 855-864, July.
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KeywordsInsurance; Fraud; Insurance companies; Corporate governance; Moral hazard; Insurance fraud; Insurance market;
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