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Optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods

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  • Ellis, Randall P.
  • Jiang, Shenyi
  • Manning, Willard G.

Abstract

We examine the efficiency-based arguments for second-best optimal health insurance with multiple treatment goods and multiple time periods. Correlated shocks across health care goods and over time interact with complementarity and substitutability to affect optimal cost sharing. Health care goods that are substitutes or have positively correlated demand shocks should have lower optimal patient cost sharing. Positive serial correlations of demand shocks and uncompensated losses that are positively correlated with covered health services also reduce optimal cost sharing. Our results rationalize covering pharmaceuticals and outpatient spending more fully than is implied by static, one good, or one period models.

Suggested Citation

  • Ellis, Randall P. & Jiang, Shenyi & Manning, Willard G., 2015. "Optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 89-106.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:41:y:2015:i:c:p:89-106
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.01.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg & Amitabh Chandra & Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2017. "What does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(3), pages 1261-1318.
    2. Boone, Jan, 2015. "Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 50-58.
    3. Amanda Starc & Robert J. Town, 2015. "Externalities and Benefit Design in Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 21783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
    5. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Maria Polyakova, 2016. "Private Provision of Social Insurance: Drug-specific Price Elasticities and Cost Sharing in Medicare Part D," NBER Working Papers 22277, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Boone, J., 2014. "Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Other publications TiSEM 6bf0e55c-e004-4c9e-8065-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Boone, J., 2014. "Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Other publications TiSEM 8ad45428-2ab4-406f-bbd3-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Health insurance; Optimal cost sharing; Risk aversion; Dynamic models; Complements and substitutes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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