What does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics
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- Brot-Goldberg, Z.C. & Chandra, A. & Handel, B. & Kolstad, J.T., 2016. "What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities and Spending Dynamics," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 16/15, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
- Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg & Amitabh Chandra & Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2015. "What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 21632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brot-Goldberg, Zarek C. & Chandra, Amitabh & Handel, Benjamin R. & Kolstad, Jonathan T., 2015. "What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics," Working Paper Series 15-060, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
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