Optimal Health Insurance and Trade‐Off between Health and Wealth
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1155/2020/2658213
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Ellis, Randall P. & Jiang, Shenyi & Manning, Willard G., 2015.
"Optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 89-106.
- Randall P. Ellis & Shenyi Jian & Willard G. Manning, 2015. "Optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2015-019, Boston University - Department of Economics.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Maria Polyakova, 2018.
"Private Provision of Social Insurance: Drug-Specific Price Elasticities and Cost Sharing in Medicare Part D,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 122-153, August.
- Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Maria Polyakova, 2016. "Private Provision of Social Insurance: Drug-specific Price Elasticities and Cost Sharing in Medicare Part D," NBER Working Papers 22277, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Boone, Jan, 2015.
"Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 50-58.
- Boone, Jan, 2014. "Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 10199, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Boone, J., 2014. "Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Discussion Paper 2014-059, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Boone, J., 2014. "Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Discussion Paper 2014-034, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Boone, J., 2014. "Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Other publications TiSEM 8ad45428-2ab4-406f-bbd3-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg & Amitabh Chandra & Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2017.
"What does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 132(3), pages 1261-1318.
- Brot-Goldberg, Zarek C. & Chandra, Amitabh & Handel, Benjamin R. & Kolstad, Jonathan T., 2015. "What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics," Working Paper Series 15-060, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Brot-Goldberg, Z.C. & Chandra, A. & Handel, B. & Kolstad, J.T., 2016. "What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities and Spending Dynamics," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 16/15, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
- Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg & Amitabh Chandra & Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad, 2015. "What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 21632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Boone, J., 2014. "Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance : Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Other publications TiSEM 6bf0e55c-e004-4c9e-8065-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Amanda Starc & Robert J. Town, 2015. "Externalities and Benefit Design in Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 21783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018.
"On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard,"
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
- Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(2), pages 137-185, September.
- Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018. "On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard," Post-Print hal-01348551, HAL.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jnljam:v:2020:y:2020:i:1:n:2658213. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/4185 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/jnljam/v2020y2020i1n2658213.html