Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance
In Chile, dependant workers are mandated to purchase health insurance and they can chose between one public provider and several private providers. Here, we analyze the relation between utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. Independent workers, however, are not mandated. In this case, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to purchase insurance. The results show adverse selection against insurance companies for independent workers and against FONASA for dependant workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization. Regarding medical visits, over consumption is quantitatively important and statistically significant in all cases (against insurance for independents; against public and private insurance in the case of dependant workers).
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- Claudio Sapelli & Bernardita Vial, 1998. "Utilización de Prestaciones de Salud en Chile: ¿Es Diferente entre Grupos de Ingreso?," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 35(106), pages 343-382.
- Claudio Sapelli & Arístides Torche, 1998. "El Seguro Previsional de Salud: Determinantes de la Elección entre Seguro Público y Privado, 1990-1994," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 35(106), pages 383-406.
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"Adverse Selection in Health Insurance,"
NBER Chapters,in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 1, pages 1-32
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cutler David M. & Zeckhauser Richard J., 1998. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-33, January.
- David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1997. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6107, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- A. C. Cameron & P. K. Trivedi & Frank Milne & J. Piggott, 1988. "A Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in Australia," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 85-106.
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