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Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets

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  • Neudeck, Werner
  • Podczeck, Konrad

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  • Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:15:y:1996:i:4:p:387-408
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
    2. Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 207-219, March.
    3. Diamond, Peter, 1992. "Organizing the Health Insurance Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1233-1254, November.
    4. Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325.
    5. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    6. Pauly, Mark V., 1984. "Is cream-skimming a problem for the competitive medical market?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 87-95, April.
    7. Herschel I. Grossman, 1979. "Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 336-343, Spring.
    8. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    9. Marquis, M. Susan, 1992. "Adverse selection with a multiple choice among health insurance plans: A simulation analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 129-151, August.
    10. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    11. van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M. & van Vliet, ReneC. J. A., 1995. "Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: An empirical study," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 149-169, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "Minimum Standards and Insurance Regulation: Evidence from the Medigap Market," NBER Working Papers 8917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2015. "Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 247-278, August.
    4. Finkelstein, Amy, 2004. "Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2515-2547, December.
    5. Finkelstein, Amy, 2004. "The interaction of partial public insurance programs and residual private insurance markets: evidence from the US Medicare program," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24, January.
    6. Olivella, Pau & Vera-Hernandez, Marcos, 2007. "Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 233-250, March.
    7. Marcelo Resende & Rodrigo Zeidan, 2010. "Adverse selection in the health insurance market: some empirical evidence," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 11(4), pages 413-418, August.
    8. Nathalie Fombaron & Carine Milcent, 2007. "The distortionary effect of health insurance on health demand," Working Papers halshs-00587713, HAL.
    9. Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "When Can Partial Public Insurance Produce Pareto Improvements?," NBER Working Papers 9035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. K. P. M. Winssen & R. C. Kleef & W. P. M. M. Ven, 2017. "A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it, the lower your premium?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(2), pages 209-226, March.
    11. Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
    12. Belli, Paolo, 2001. "How adverse selection affects the health insurance market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2574, The World Bank.
    13. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2009. "Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(2), pages 176-197, April.
    14. Vijay Aseervatham & Christoph Lex & Spindler, Martin, 2014. "How do unisex rating regulations affect gender differences in insurance premiums?," MEA discussion paper series 201416, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
    15. Sandro Leal Alves, 2007. "Saúde Suplementar: Evidências De Seleção Adversa Após A Regulação," Anais do XXXV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 35th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 081, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    16. Yamamoto, Shinichi & Yoneyama, Takau & Kwon, W. Jean, 2012. "An Experimental Study On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 46(1), pages 51-64, January.
    17. Encinosa, William, 2001. "A comment on Neudeck and Podczeck's "adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets"," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 667-673, July.
    18. Jeonghoon Ahn, 2004. "Panel Data Sample Selection Model: an Application to Employee Choice of Health Plan Type and Medical Cost Estimation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 560, Econometric Society.
    19. Encinosa, William, 2001. "The economics of regulatory mandates on the HMO market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 85-107, January.
    20. Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2002. "Setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality in health care: minimum variance optimal risk adjustment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 153-173, May.
    21. Soderlund, Neil, 1998. "Possible objectives and resulting entitlements of essential health care packages," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 195-208, September.
    22. Selden, Thomas M., 1999. "Premium subsidies for health insurance: excessive coverage vs. adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 709-725, December.

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