Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Pauly, Mark V., 1984. "Is cream-skimming a problem for the competitive medical market?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 87-95, April.
- Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
- Diamond, Peter, 1992. "Organizing the Health Insurance Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1233-54, November.
- Hellwig, Martin, 1987.
"Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325.
- Hellwig,Martin, 1986. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection," Discussion Paper Serie A 82, University of Bonn, Germany.
- B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
- van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M. & van Vliet, ReneC. J. A., 1995. "Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: An empirical study," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 149-169, June.
- Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
- Marquis, M. Susan, 1992. "Adverse selection with a multiple choice among health insurance plans: A simulation analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 129-151, August.
- Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 207-219, March.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 1979. "Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 336-343, Spring.
- Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
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