The distortionary effect of health insurance on health demand
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- Bijlsma, M. & Boone, J. & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2009.
"Selective Contracting and Foreclosure in Health Care Markets,"
2009-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Bijlsma, Michiel & Boone, Jan & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2009. "Selective contracting and foreclosure in health care markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 7576, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michiel Bijlsma & Jan Boone & Gijsbert Zwart, 2010. "Selective contracting and foreclosure in health care markets," CPB Discussion Paper 140, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
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Keywordshealth insurance; adverse selection; health care; public/private; compulsory/voluntary insurance;
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