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Multidimensional private information, market structure, and insurance markets

Author

Listed:
  • Hanming Fang
  • Zenan Wu

Abstract

We investigate whether selection based on multidimensional private information in risks and risk preferences can, under different market structures, result in a negative correlation between insurance coverage and ex post realization of risk. We show that, under perfect competition, selection based on multidimensional private information does not result in the negative correlation property, unless there is a sufficiently high loading factor. However, it is possible to generate the negative correlation property under monopoly when risk and risk preference types are sufficiently negative dependent. We also clarify the connections between important concepts such as adverse/advantageous selection and positive/negative correlation property.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanming Fang & Zenan Wu, 2018. "Multidimensional private information, market structure, and insurance markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(3), pages 751-787, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:49:y:2018:i:3:p:751-787
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12251
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    Cited by:

    1. Karlsson, Martin & Klohn, Florian & Rickayzen, Ben, 2018. "The role of heterogeneous parameters for the detection of selection in insurance contracts," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 110-121.
    2. Capatina, Elena, 2020. "Selection in employer sponsored health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    3. Daniel Bauer & Jochen Russ & Nan Zhu, 2020. "Asymmetric information in secondary insurance markets: Evidence from the life settlements market," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1143-1175, July.
    4. Hanming Fang & Ami Ko, 2018. "Partial Rating Area Offering in the ACA Marketplaces: Facts, Theory and Evidence," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Oct 2018.
    5. R. Anton Braun & Karen A. Kopecky & Tatyana Koreshkova, 2017. "Old, Frail, and Uninsured: Accounting for Puzzles in the U.S. Long-Term Care Insurance Market," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2017-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    6. De La Mata, Dolores & Machado, Matilde P. & Olivella, Pau & Valdés, Maria Nieves, 2022. "Asymmetric Information with multiple risks: the case of the Chilean Private Health Insurance Market," UC3M Working papers. Economics 35441, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. Casey Rothschild & Paul D. Thistle, 2022. "Supply, demand, and selection in insurance markets: Theory and applications in pictures," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 419-444, December.
    8. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco & Reyniers, Diane, 2021. "Too much trade: A problem of adverse selection," MPRA Paper 107084, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Rory McGee, 2023. "Adverse selection among early adopters and unraveling innovation," IFS Working Papers W23/40, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    10. Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2021. "Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 579-614, September.
    11. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco & Reyniers, Diane, 2021. "Too much trade: The hidden problem of adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    12. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2023. "Empirical analyses of selection and welfare in insurance markets: a self-indulgent survey," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 48(2), pages 167-191, September.
    13. Roy McGee, 2023. "Adverse Selection Among Early Adopters and Unraveling Innovation," University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP) Working Papers 2022302, University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP).
    14. Levy, Yehuda John & Veiga, Andre, 2020. "On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 140-168.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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