The role of government in health insurance markets with adverse selection
This paper analyzes the welfare economics of three arrangements for purchasing health insurance: competitive markets in which consumers are free to choose among options with different levels of coverage and prices; systems with compulsory partial pooling which permit private firms to sell supplementary coverage; and government-run pools that purchase comprehensive coverage at a single price for all consumers. Competitive insurance markets are assumed to face the problem of 'adverse selection'. This refers to a situation in which the insurer cannot observe characteristics of individuals that affect the cost of insurance and that are known to the individuals. Competitive markets with adverse selection are not efficient because low risks cannot purchase comprehensive insurance coverage. However, government-run pools with comprehensive coverage are an inefficient solution to the problem of adverse selection. Compulsory partial coverage may represent an attractive alternative to both competitive markets and comprehensive pools. We discover two situations when government intervention of this type will succeed: when there are not many high risks in the population, and when the risk types are similar. We discuss the implications of these results for health insurance programs in several countries. Our results also have implications for the allocation of public funds for disease-prevention projects. A project targeted at high risks will produce external benefits for low risks, even though they are not directly affected by the program. However, a successful project might eliminate the market for private insurance; in this case the government should consider mandating partial insurance coverage.Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 7 (1998)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:7:y:1998:i:8:p:659-670. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.