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Access to coverage for high-risks in a competitive individual health insurance market: via premium rate restrictions or risk-adjusted premium subsidies?

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  • van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M.
  • van Vliet, Rene C. J. A.
  • Schut, Frederik T.
  • van Barneveld, Erik M.

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  • van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M. & van Vliet, Rene C. J. A. & Schut, Frederik T. & van Barneveld, Erik M., 2000. "Access to coverage for high-risks in a competitive individual health insurance market: via premium rate restrictions or risk-adjusted premium subsidies?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 311-339, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:19:y:2000:i:3:p:311-339
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Newhouse, Joseph P., 1984. "Cream skimming, asymmetric information, and a competitive insurance market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 97-100, April.
    2. Diamond, Peter, 1992. "Organizing the Health Insurance Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1233-1254, November.
    3. Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Feldstein, Paul J., 1997. "The effect of price on switching among health plans," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 231-247, April.
    4. Pauly, Mark V & Kunreuther, Howard & Hirth, Richard, 1995. "Guaranteed Renewability in Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 143-156, March.
    5. van Barneveld, Erik M. & Lamers, Leida M. & van Vliet, René C. J. A. & van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M., 1998. "Mandatory pooling as a supplement to risk-adjusted capitation payments in a competitive health insurance market," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 223-232, July.
    6. R. C. J. A. Van Vliet & W. P. M. M. van de Ven, 1993. "Capitation payments based on prior hospitalizations," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 2(2), pages 177-188, July.
    7. Van de ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Ellis, Randall P., 2000. "Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 755-845, Elsevier.
    8. Erik Schokkaert & Geert Dhaene & Carine Van De Voorde, 1998. "Risk adjustment and the trade‐off between efficiency and risk selection: an application of the theory of fair compensation," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(5), pages 465-480, August.
    9. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    10. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    11. Pauly, Mark V., 1984. "Is cream-skimming a problem for the competitive medical market?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 87-95, April.
    12. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
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