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Anti-Insurance: Analysing the Health Insurance System in Australia

Author

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  • Joshua S. Gans

    (Melbourne Business School and Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne)

  • Stephen P. King

    (Melbourne Business School and Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne)

Abstract

This paper develops a model to analyse the Australian health insurance system when individuals differ in their health risk and this risk is private information. The Australian system involves mixed public and private health insurance with private insurance both duplicating and supplementing public insurance. We show that, absent any other interventions, the Australian system implicitly transfers wealth from those most at risk of adverse health to those least at risk. When considered over society as a whole, these transfers represent a mean preserving spread of income, creating social risk and lowering welfare. We refer to these implicit transfers as anti-insurance. Further, we use comparative statics to show that a decline in the take-up of private insurance may lead to a reduction in the welfare of all members of society. Increased take-up of private health insurance may be Pareto improving. We consider the recently introduced rebate on private health insurance and show that this alleviates this welfare reducing anti-insurance. However, its ad valorem nature distorts insurance premiums. We demonstrate that a lump sum rebate could achieve the same reduction in anti-insurance while avoiding additional dead weight losses. Nonetheless, we conclude by suggesting that more significant reform of the Australian system is needed, for example by moving to a system of supplementary private health insurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, 2003. "Anti-Insurance: Analysing the Health Insurance System in Australia," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2003n10, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
  • Handle: RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2003n10
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    File URL: http://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/downloads/working_paper_series/wp2003n10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeremiah Hurley & Rhema Vaithianathana & Thomas F. Crossley & Deborah Cobb-Clark, 2001. "Parallel Private Health Insurance in Australia: A Cautionary Tale and Lessons for Canada," Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis Working Paper Series 2001-12, Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis (CHEPA), McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada.
    2. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    3. William Jack, 1998. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing and Health Insurance Financing," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 74(225), pages 153-161, June.
    4. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
    5. Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2002. "Will Subsidising Private Health Insurance Help the Public Health System?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 78(242), pages 277-283, September.
    6. Amy Finkelstein, 2002. "When Can Partial Public Insurance Produce Pareto Improvements?," NBER Working Papers 9035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    8. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    9. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    10. Jack, William, 1998. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing and Health Insurance Financing," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 74(225), pages 153-161, June.
    11. Rhema Vaithianathan, 2002. "Will Subsidising Private Health Insurance Help the Public Health System?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 78(242), pages 277-283, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Buchmueller, 2008. "Community Rating, Entry-Age Rating and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance in Australia*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 33(4), pages 588-609, October.
    2. Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Fiebig, Denzil G. & Jones, Glenn & Savage, Elizabeth, 2013. "Preference heterogeneity and selection in private health insurance: The case of Australia," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 757-767.

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