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Cooperation, Correlation and Competition in Ergodic $N$-Player Games and Mean-Field Games of Singular Controls: A Case Study

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Listed:
  • Cannerozzi, Federico

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Ferrari, Giorgio

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

We consider ergodic symmetric $N$-player and mean-field games of singular control in both cooperative and competitive settings. The state process dynamics of a representative player follow geometric Brownian motion, controlled additively through a nondecreasing process. Agents aim to maximize a long-time average reward functional with instantaneous profit of power type. The game shows strategic complementarities, in that the marginal profit function is increasing with respect to the dynamic average of the states of the other players, when $N

Suggested Citation

  • Cannerozzi, Federico & Ferrari, Giorgio, 2024. "Cooperation, Correlation and Competition in Ergodic $N$-Player Games and Mean-Field Games of Singular Controls: A Case Study," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 691, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:691
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2988979/2988980
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferrari, Giorgio & Tzouanas, Ioannis, 2025. "Stationary Mean-Field Games of Singular Control under Knightian Uncertainty," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 706, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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