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Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets

  • Geir B. , Asheim

    ()

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Voorneveld, Max

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • W. Weibull, Jörgen

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles,and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

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File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2010/Memo-01-2010.pdf
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 01/2010.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 07 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2010_001
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway

Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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  1. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Zambrano, Eduardo, 2008. "Epistemic conditions for rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 395-405, May.
  3. Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg & H. Jerome Keisler, 2008. "Admissibility in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 307-352, 03.
    • Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg & H. Jerome Keisler, 2014. "Admissibility in Games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 7, pages 161-212 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  4. Andreas Blume, 1996. "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Game Theory and Information 9604001, EconWPA.
  5. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006. "Network formation with heterogeneous players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 353-372, February.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  8. K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
  9. Olivier Tercieux, 2006. "p-Best response set," Post-Print halshs-00754120, HAL.
  10. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
  11. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  12. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  13. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1996. "A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1375-93, November.
  14. Hurkens, Sjaak, 1996. "Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 186-197, April.
  15. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  16. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
  17. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  18. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  19. Basu, K. & Weibull, J.W., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour," Papers 479, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  20. Hu, Tai-Wei, 2007. "On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 379-391, September.
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