Choice-theoretic Solutions for Strategic Form Games
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- Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2003. "On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-098/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Tercieux, Olivier, 2006. "p-Best response set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 45-70, November.
- Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
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