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An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets

  • Mark Voorneveld

    ()

  • Willemien Kets
  • Henk Norde

Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent.A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games.The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ.Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept is axiomatized in this article.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0012-y
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 153-153

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:153-153
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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  2. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
  4. Norde, Henk & Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries, 1996. "Equilibrium Selection and Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 219-225, February.
  5. Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H.W. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory," Other publications TiSEM a92b40c8-7807-47db-8abd-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  6. Basu, K. & Weibull, J., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behavior," Papers 62, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  7. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
  8. Patrone, F. & Pieri, G. & Tijs, S.H. & Torre, A., 1996. "On Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games," Research Memorandum 732, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  9. Peleg, B. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games," Other publications TiSEM 159e2ef3-4411-4900-9bf1-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  10. Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "Persistent retracts and preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 228-232, April.
  11. repec:spr:compst:v:54:y:2001:i:1:p:119-131 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
  13. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  14. van Damme, Eric, 1998. "On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 181-210, July.
  15. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
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