Preparation and toolkit learning
A product set of pure strategies is a prep set ("prep" is short for "preparation") if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.
|Date of creation:||04 Jan 2002|
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"The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory,"
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