Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics
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- Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2008. "Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics," Discussion Papers 0806, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2015.
"The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 165-193, February.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2014. "The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 466, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
- Christopher Kah & Markus Walzl, 2015. "Stochastic Stability in a Learning Dynamic with Best Response to Noisy Play," Working Papers 2015-15, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2016. "The refined best reply correspondence and backward induction," Graz Economics Papers 2016-11, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2009. "The Refined Best-Response Correspondence and Backward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000248, David K. Levine.
- Xu, Zibo, 2016. "Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 21-54.
More about this item
Keywords
Evolutionary game theory; best response dynamics; CURB sets; persistent retracts; asymptotic stability; Nash equilibrium refinements; learning;JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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