Leadership games with convex strategy sets
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- Bernhard von Stengel & Shmuel Zamir, 2009. "Leadership Games with Convex Strategy Sets," Discussion Paper Series dp525, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- von Stengel, Bernhard & Zamir, Shmuel, 2010. "Leadership games with convex strategy sets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27653, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bernhard von Stengel, 2016. "Recursive Inspection Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(3), pages 935-952, August.
- Rabah Amir & Giuseppe Feo, 2014. "Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 629-658, August.
- Kuzmics, Christoph & Balkenborg, Dieter & Hofbauer, Josef, 2013. "Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
- Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016. "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Marco Marini & Giorgio Rodano, 2012. "Sequential vs Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games," DIAG Technical Reports 2012-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
More about this item
KeywordsCommitment Correlated equilibrium First-mover advantage Follower Leader Stackelberg game;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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